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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
U.C.A. 76-4-203 defines 'Criminal Solicitation'. It provides the following:
a)
An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felonv be
committed, he solicited, requested, commanded, or offered to hire, or
importuned another person to engage in specific conduct that under
the circumstances as the actor believed them to be would be a felony
or would cause the other person to be a party to the commission of a
felony.
(Emphasis Added)
It continues in paragraph two:
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation
is made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent that the offense be committed. (Emphasis Added)
U.C.A. 76-2-103 provides:
A person engages in conduct intentionally when it is his
conscious desire or objective to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12;
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Does the exploration or mere talk within the proscription of the
'Solicitation' Statute? Is there a requirement for an agreement to a specific course
of action?
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STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant herein is alleged to have committed the offense of Solicitation
to Commit Aggravated Assault (a Third Degree Felony). This is an appeal from
the order of sentencing. The defendant was committed to the Utah State Prison
for a period not to exceed five (5) years.
The State alleged that the defendant, with the intent that a felony be
committed, he solicited, requested, commanded, or offered to hire, or
importuned another person to engage in specific conduct that under the
circumstances as the actor believed them to be would be a felony or would cause
the other person to be a party to the commission of a felony, said felony being to
intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another (Aggravated Assault). The
alleged victim is his ex-wife.
The defendant challenged this accusation by seeking a dismissal of the
information. The defendant entered a "Sery Plea" to the charge, reserving his
right to challenge the conviction on appeal. Defendant argues that the State's
evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The State's accusation is based on conversations between Phillip Meza and
James Magarrell. Both Meza and Magarell were both incarcerated in the Utah
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County Jail work release program. Mr. Meza testifies that Magarrell contacted
him on August 6, 2000 (T. 6 L. 14) to discuss 'solving a problem' with his ex-wife.
In the discussions that ensued between August 6, 2000 through August 8,
2000, Meza and Magarell discussed a list of possible conduct including:

a)
b)
c)

Homicide (T. 8 L. 9),
Having her disappear (T. 27 L. 9-18),
Having her sexually assaulted (T. 39 L.l), or

d)

Simply do nothing (T. 40 L. 5-8).

No agreement existed as a specific or concrete course of action. No
decision was reached. T.38 L. 2-24.
After a brief jailhouse discussion on August 6, Mr. Meza advised he had a
friend (T.9 L. 12) who would assist in solving the problem but it would cost
$10,000.00 (T. 27 L. 20). However, no further conversations should occur and
nothing would be 'put in place' (T.40 L. 2-4/ T.36 L.15) until Magarell had
provided the following:
1-a photo of his ex-wife,
2-addresses for her work and home,
3- $5,000 cash, and,
4- keys to car.
(T. 9 L. 20. /T.29 L. 24/ T. 37. L. 10.)
None were ever produced excepting a partial address. T. 30 L. 3 / T.30 L.
25/ T.32. L.24 / T. 41 L.ll.
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Immediately after the August 6, 2000 meeting, Meza contacted officers at
the Utah County Sheriffs office (T. 11 L. 11) and attempted to negotiate a deal.
An agreement was reached and he was paid approximately $420.00 bv the
Sheriff, given an early release from a jail (9 months) and financial assistance in
moving. T. 42 L. 24 -T. 43 L. 14 / T. 44 L 13 / T. 54 L. 17. Under the Sheriffs
instructions, Mr. Meza was then instructed to contact Magarrell. He did and a
meeting was then to be set up at a Motel 6 in Lehi, Utah. T. 13 L. 13/ T. 14 L. 8.
The meeting was monitored by audio and video cameras. Officers listened in an
adjacent room. T. 13 L. 22.
Mr. Meza testified as well as Deputy Sheriff Monson and the alleged
victim's father. The Motel 6 video was played to the Court and is included as an
exhibit. (No transcript was created of the video's dialogue but it is included in
the exhibits.)
The meeting occurred on August 8, 2000. The meeting is summarized as
follows: Meza asked Magarell if he had what he needed:
1. Photos;
2. Addresses;
3. Keys; and
4.

Cash.

Magarell told him no—he "doesn't have shit". T. 32.d L. 1-10/ T.32 L 24/
T. 36 L17-25. See Video. There was to be no meeting and nothing was to be put
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in motion unless the money and information was delivered. T.40 L.2. Magarell
said he was not ready to 'go 7 . T.32 L.ll. Magarell told Meza that he can't give
him 'shit todav'. T. 36 L. 15. T. 33 L. 17-21 T. 33 L. 12-14 / T. 35 L. 6.
Magarell told Meza that he needed more time to get everything together.
T.32 L.10-17. Meza did not know when the money would be paid but he knew
nothing was going to happen for two weeks. T. 36 L.ll / T.33 L.17.
Magarell advised Meza that he did not want anything to happen until
Magarell said it was a 'go' (T.35 L.20 / T.35 L. 20) and, even then, he may call up
and tell him to do nothing. T.40 L. 5-8. Meza suggested some surveillance begin
on the ex-wife. This was not done. T.34 L.10.
Magarell told Meza that he (Magarell) would set the timetable but he may
choose to call the whole thing off. T. 40 L. 5-8. Meza attempts to push the deal to
a conclusion. See Video. (Arguably, Meza is expects to be released from jail if he
gets Magarell to say the magic words. Magarell has not provided the data,
money or photos. Magarell refuses to give him any authority to go ahead.)
Meza again asked Magarell if he had any of the items he needed to put
this in motion. Magarell stated again no. T. 32 L. 1-10. T. 32 L. 24 / T. 36 L. 17-25.
Meza asks for the ex-wife's name, her address, where she worked, her
work schedule, a description of her car, and license plate number. Meza told
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Magarell that if you give me that kind of schedule today and he will go to work
on it today. No schedule was produced.
Meza pushed further and asks for a key to the car. Magarell delaved
again and told him that he will deliver the key when he delivers the monev.
Meza pushes on and Magarell communicates a partial address of her
home (1000 East, Orem) with no northern or southern quadrant given. T. 54. L.
14. See Video. He described the office where she works and gives them a
personal description of her, the car she drives but partially misstates the year of
the Isuzu Trooper. T. 30 L. 10-12.
The video shows that Magarell is writing down some information on a
piece of paper but never gives it to Meza. (The video documents Meza getting a
piece of paper from a desk to have Magarell write down the information.
Magarell refuses. He, however, writes down some data on paper he has retrieved
from his (Magarell) attache but does not give it to Meza.) Deputy Monson
listening via a transmitter from another room confirms the video version. T. 54 L.
14. Nothing is given to Meza. T.54 L. 14.
Regarding her employment address, Magarell seemingly looked through
a phone book to obtain an address but does not give one. The videotape
suggests that he could not find the address. See Video. It is, however, easily
found within the white pages.
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Meza pushed for information but Magarell delays Meza again, telling him
that he would get the information to him by dropping it in his car window. This
was not done either. T. 32 L. 24. Magarell confirms that no money would be paid
for weeks, (T. 33 L. 12-14 / T. 35 L. 6) and nothing was to happen until money
was paid. T. 36 L. 15. T. 33 L. 17-21. Magarell delays Meza by asking for
additional weeks and fails to drop the information in the Meza's car. T. 39 L. 1013 / T. 40 L. 2.
Further, the issue of what was to be done is incomplete and undecided.
There was no agreement regarding any specific course of conduct. T. 37 L. 17 L.
24. Magarell is undecided. T. 41 L. 14. Magarell also tells Meza that if it comes
down to i t he may call and tell him to do nothing. T. 40 L. 5-8.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ARE NOT MET
For this conviction to stand, the State must show that the defendant had
agreed with another to commit an aggravated assault on his ex-wife. He must
have desired and intended the assault to have taken place. Intent is not
presumed.
There must be some element beyond mere verbal expression or desire.
The evidence here is lacking.
1) There was no agreement for a specific result (conduct). The ideas
explored ranged from a violent death, death with a rape, a simple disappearance,
an assault (turning her into a vegetable) or nothing—calling the whole thing off.
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2) Neither information nor payment was given to initiate anv conduct.
The information and money was a condition precedent to any conduct occurring.
No photos, no money, no key were given.
ARGUMENT
APPLICABLE CASE LAW & TREATISES
Due to the dangers in defining anticipatory offenses which punish talk,
expressions, and ideas, Model Acts and the legislature have specifically required
strongly corroborative evidence (i.e. some conduct) demonstrating an
individual's intent (U.C.A. 76-4-203 (2)); for there is a legitimate hesitancy to
punish ideas and bad thought without accompanying conduct. U.C.A.76-1-104
(2).
Joking, inquisitorial comments or even an exploration of an idea or a bad
thought does not justify a conviction. We do not punish bad thoughts no matter
how horrific they may be. State v. lohnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v.
Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d 353 (1957). There must be some element beyond
mere verbal expression. State v. Rivers (Maine 1993) 634 A.2d 1261; U.C.A. 76-1104 (2).
However, in defining anticipatory offenses (attempts, solicitation,
conspiracy to commit) certain dangers arise as we seek to stop such conduct
before it achieves results. Yet legislatures and courts have been reluctant to
imposed criminal sanctions on bad thoughts without some strong corroborating
evidence accompanied by specific conduct (a substantial step/active or positive
action).
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Recognizing such hesitancy and dangers, Courts have required the State
to prove that there wras some point in time at which the defendant had induced
another to commit a specific offense, with the intent to cause the commission of a
specific crime and the defendant believing and intending that the crime take
place. Schwenk v. State of Texas, 733 SW2d 142 (Tex Crim. App. 1987).
The entertainment of the idea of committing the crime is insufficient.
Talking about it is insufficient. Mere talk or even preparation is not enough.
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d
353 (1957). The mere inquiry into whether someone would commit a crime is not
sufficient. The mere asking of another to commit a crime is not sufficient. You
must have the conscious desire or objective to cause the particular result. There
must be some concrete course intended; the solicitor must intend to achieve that
result through the participation of another. It must be the defendant's intent that
the crime be committed.
Lafave & Scott's Treatise on Criminal Law provides:
Although the crime of solicitation might be defined quite simply as
asking another person to commit an offense, this does not adequately
reflect either the mental element or act, which must exist in order for the
crime to be completed.
As to the required mental state, none is explicitly stated in the usual
common law definition of solicitation, and likewise none is expressly set
forth in several solicitation statutes. However, the acts of commanding or
requesting another to engage in conduct which is criminal would seem of
necessity to require an accompanying intent that such conduct occur, and
there is nothing in the decided cases suggesting otherwise. . ..
Thus, as to those crimes, which are defined in terms of certain
prohibited results, it is necessary that the solicitor intend to achieve that
result through the participation of another. If he does not intend such a
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result, then the crime has not been solicited, and this is true even though
the person solicited will have committed the crime if he proceeds with the
requested conduct and thereby causes the prohibited result. For example,
if B were to engage in criminally negligent conduct which caused the
death of C, then B would be guilty of manslaughter; but it would not be a
criminal solicitation to commit murder or manslaughter for A to request B
to engage in such conduct unless A did so for the purpose of causing C s
death.
Likewise, where the prohibited result involves special
circumstances as to which a mens rea requirement is imposed, the solicitor
cannot be said to have intended that result unless he personally had this
added mental state. (Emphasis Added)
See Lafave & Scott, Page 489-490. Anticipatory Offense: Parties.
The Model Penal Code & Commentaries, Part 1 Section 5:02 (1985),
at page 371, states that it is not enough for a person to be aware that his words
may lead to a criminal act or even to be quite sure they will do so; it must be the
actor's purpose that the crime be committed. It is necessary that the term
solicitation carry some concrete course of conduct that it is the actor's object to
incite, at page 377. This would be analogous to the provisions of U.C. A. 76-3403(2) requiring strongly corroborative evidence of intent.
Statutorily, U.C.A. 76-4-203 (2) requires as an element of the offense that
there be the engagement of a specific course of conduct. Here none exists. The
discussions between Meza and Magarel] ranged from 'nothing to be done' to
'homicide' with a varying conduct in between (rape to aggravated assault).
UTAH COURTS. The Utah Courts seem hesitant to support convictions
upon similar facts. In State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) the Court
overturned the conviction for Attempted Homicide. The Johnson Court held
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the
intent to kill or knowledge that her acts would be carried out or would result in
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the death of her husband and thereby engage in some conduct constituting a
substantial step toward causing the death of the victim. The evidence identified
the defendant as purchasing counterfeit 'crank' from undercover officers but
there was no showing that she attempted to administer the substance. The court
held, as they did in State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1983), that in order
for the conduct to constitute a substantial step, there must be more than mere
preparation. The Castonguay Court found that when "we say that a man
attempted to do a given wrong, we mean that he intended to do specifically it,
and proceeded a certain way in the doing". The Johnson Court also cited State v.
Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646,647 (1981) wherein the Idaho Court found that
the purchase of counterfeit crank from an undercover officer does not go beyond
mere preparation and therefore does not constitute a substantial step.
See also State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d 353 (1957), where a
policeman acting on information that robbery of a Safeway store was planned,
went with one Robinson to a hotel room occupied by the defendant and another.
These men were found in the room and each had in his possession a loaded
revolver. Questioning these men revealed that they were strangers in town and
that they did not offer any explanation of any proper business or employment in
the area. They had no explanation for possessing the loaded pistols. Upon being
confronted, Weldon admitted that his intent was to rob the Safeway store. A
conviction was obtained for robbery on those limited facts.
The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient. The Court ruled that
there must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti
prior to the admission of the statements.
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The Utah holdings would suggest that there must be something more than
mere talk and the exploration of an idea. There must be some concrete course of
action undertaken. Specific criminal intent is an essential element of the charge
and it cannot be presumed. U.C. A. 76-2-101, U.C. A.76-2-103, State v. Pitts, 728
P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), State v. Tohnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989). Any
presumption of intent is constitutionally barred. State v. Turner, 736 P.2D 1043
(Utah 1987).
Preparation is insufficient. One must take a substantial step under the
"attempt' 7 statute. Under the solicitation statute, there must be an agreement to a
concrete course of action with an intended a specific result.
Other Jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions agree. A specific or concrete
course of action is mandated.
In People v. Salazar, 140 Mich. App.137, 362 N.W.2d 913, the Michigan
Court of Appeals addressed a similar case. There a paid informant was
incarcerated in the County Jail (as here) on the guise that he was convicted of a
narcotic offense. The defendant was incarcerated as well. The informant soon
was on a conversational basis with the accused. Discussions occurred wherein
the defendant advised that he had an appeal pending and he wished that two
witnesses in the former trial (police officers) would tell the truth on appeal. The
informant (Martinez) suggested that he had some connections to make them tell
the truth as in breaking an arm. Defendant refused the offer and indicated that
when he took care of them and when he did he would take car of them for good.
Defendant also said that he had some experience in explosives and that he
wanted the witnesses to be taken care of by a car bomb. The informant then
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suggested that he had some connections with friends possessing explosives but
that thev wanted a 'fair price' for it.
The defendant then told the informant that cash payment would be
arranged through a friend. He told the informant that he did not want to meet
with anybody. A meeting was scheduled but the defendant did not show up.
Thereafter, the informant asked if the defendant would give him the contract to
kill the witnesses. Defendant replied affirmatively but kept putting the
informant off as to specifics. The defendant was convicted at trial and appealed.
The Salazar Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the element of
"imminent" action. The defendant did not urge the acts to be done immediately
The Court held that the evidence did not indicate that anything had gone even
beyond the preparatory stages, e.g., obtaining explosives, or that the defendant
intend to immediately proceed to kill either witness. As here, the informant kept
pushing the defendant for something imminent (a concrete course of action) and
the defendant kept putting him off.
The Salazar Court reviewed prior holdings in People v. Owens, 131 Mich.
App. 76, 345 N.W.2d 904 (1983). In Owens, as here, the defendant was to pay
one-half of the fee but ultimately paid nothing. In addition, the defendant was to
give to the undercover officer schedules and photographs of the intended
victims. As here, none were produced. The Owens court overturned the
conviction.
See also State v. Suggs, 453 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. App. 1995), wherein the
defendant appealed his conviction of solicitation to commit an assault on another
with a deadly weapon and inflicting serious bodily injury. The defendant (wife)
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was charged after Bateman confessed to the shooting of the defendant's former
husband, Suggs, and Bateman told the officers that the defendant hired him to
kill Suggs and a woman (Johnson) whom Mr. Suggs had been dating. Bateman
revealed two plans as the State's kev witness; one was to attack Johnson and the
other was to kill Suggs. Bateman had a series of conversations with the
defendant, during which she told him about Johnson and the two agreed that
Bateman would break (Johnson's) face or break her legs for $2,500, which the
defendant later paid to Bateman. Bateman testified that after four months of
Bateman stalling over Johnson, the defendant and Bateman agreed that Bateman
would kill Suggs for $15,000, through a series of subsequent telephone calls
between Bateman and Suggs. Nothing further was said about the arrangement to
injure Johnson, and no assault occurred on Johnson. Thereafter, the defendant
advanced Bateman $2,000 and later gave Bateman a picture of Suggs and drove
him by Sugg's home.
The North Carolina Court held that for the defendant to be liable for the
substantive crime of solicitation but finding the State must prove a request to
perform every essential element of the crime referencing Johnson. The Court
held that for the State to prevail it must produce substantial evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant and Bateman contemplated the use of a
deadly weapon in carrying out the assault on Johnson. There was no evidence of
how Bateman was to inflict the severe injury on Johnson and furthermore the
mere fact that the defendant asked Bateman to inflict serious injury on Tohnson
did not necessarily imply the use of a deadly weapon. The Court contrasted this
factual scenario to State v. Brown, 67 N.C.App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183,191 where the
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Court held there was sufficient evidence of a deadly weapon for conspiracv to
commit felonious assault when the defendant gave his co-conspirator a knife
before the assault.
Here as in Suggs, no agreement was achieved as to what assault, if any,
was to occur. There was no specific course of conduct sought.
See also U.S. v. Rahman, 34 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1994), wherein the Federal
Government sought to convict the defendant of solicitation to commit robbery
and extortion. The factual statement is quite lengthy but relevant to this matter.
The defendant Rahman had a son and son-in-law who had stolen an entire
truckload of Christmas novelties. They attempted to sell the load but were
unsuccessful. They contacted another person by the name of Haik. Haik stored
the merchandise for them and they eventually transported it out of state to sell.
The plan did not work well and the property became an albatross to the three.
The son and son-in-law owed money to the defendant for rent but couldn't pay
due to the advances given Haik. These facts were eventually conveyed to the
defendant and he became angry and made threatening statements about Haik.
An FBI informant (Samara) overheard some of the threatening statements about
killing Haik and set up arrangement to record the statements via tape recordings
with the FBI listening. The threatening statements were recorded and proceeded
to trial. However, no money was paid and it was unclear whether Rahman
wanted any physical harm to come to Haik. It was clear that he wanted his
money.
The Federal Court of Appeals dealt with a similar statute to Utah's, which
required strongly corroborative circumstances that Rahman intended the hit man
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(Henke) to extort and rob Haik of $60,000. The Court held that the government
had to show that Rahman solicited, commanded, induced, or otherwise tried to
persuade Henke to carry out the extortion and robbery.
The Court held the evidence insufficient. The Court found that Rahman
was angered by Haik's actions and belligerently voiced his ill will toward Haik.
Henke, posing as a Mafia hit man, attempted to get Rahman to hire him to kill or
rob Haik. Rahman spoke to Henke and sought to use Henke as a bill collector.
Henke explained that he could only be hired to kill or maim Haik.
Henke told Rahman that $2500 had to be paid up front for Henke to kill
Haik. After that meeting, Rahman never contacted Samara or took any action to
hire Henke. Two weeks later, Henke appeared and told Rahman that he had
kidnapped Haik and retrieved the goods, on his own initiative. Rahman and his
son were surprised that Henke had done anything since Rahman had neither
spoken with Samara or Henke, nor had he paid the supposedly requisite upfront money. Henke demanded payment and Rahman paid him. Rahman
requested that Henke spare Haik's life, since they had paid Henke as requested.
Money had even passed hands after the fact to Henke via Rahman.
The Court held that the Government had failed to prove that Rahman
intended and solicited Henke to rob and extort Haik. The Court concluded that
even in the most favorable light given to the Government, there was scant
evidence to show, let alone meet the statutory requirement to strongly
corroborate, Brahmans intent to have Henke rob and extort Haik. The Court also
found the evidence lacking that Rahman tried to induce Henke to carry out those
crimes.
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CONCLUSION
For the State to meet their burden of proof, they must exhibit evidence
demonstrating that the defendant had the conscious desire or intent to follow
through with each of the specified elements of this crime. He must desire the
assault to have taken place. We do not and cannot presume his intent. We judge
it only from objectively viewed conduct.
There must be some element beyond mere verbal expression. The State
must prove that there was some point in time at which the defendant had
induced another to commit aggravated assault, with the intent to cause the
commission of the crime and the defendant believing that the crime would take
place.
The evidence here is lacking.
1) There was no agreement for a specific result (conduct). The ideas
explored ranged from a violent death, death with a rape, a simple disappearance,
an assault (turning her into a vegetable) or nothing—calling the whole thing off.
2) Neither information nor payment was given to initiate any conduct.
The information and money was a condition precedent to any conduct occurring.
No photos, no money, no key were given. The best the prosecution has to offer is
that the defendant gave a partial address.
The Utah holdings would suggest that there must be something more than
mere talk and the exploration of an idea. There must be some concrete course of
action undertaken. Even preparatory stages of a crime are insufficient. One
must take a substantial step under the "attempt" statute. Under the solicitation
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statute, one must have an agreement to a concrete course of action intending a
specific result.
Here, the conversation did not go beyond simply talk.

DATED this

> < ^ day of July, 2001.

SHEUDEN R CARTEI
Attorney for Defendant
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